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| | Representationalism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia |
 | | A problem with representationalism is that if it assumes that something in the brain, described as a homunculus, is viewing the perception, this suggests that some physical effect or phenomenon other than simple data flow and information processing must be involved in perception. | | | Dreams and imaginings can be considered representations in a way analogous to perceptions, perhaps, as recent fMRI studies have shown, using similar areas of the brain. | | | A further difficulty is that, since we only have knowledge of the representations of our perceptions, how is it possible to show that they resemble in any significant way the objects to which they are supposed to correspond? |
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representationalism
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| | Clasical and COnnectionist Models - Eric Lormand |
| | Unfortunately, the notion of a computational relation is typically left unclear, and the specification of which relations are appropriate for which attitudes is typically left to the development of cognitive science. | | | First, it would be sufficient to distinguish representationalism from token physicalism, since token physicalism about propositional attitudes is committed only to the existence of representational physical states or events, and not to the existence of representational physical objects. | | | As a result, the current formulation of representationalism fails to require the postulation of any representations other than those "already" postulated by functionalism and token physicalism. |
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http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lormand/phil/cogsci/diss_ch0.htm
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| | [No title] |
| | The second strategy leads to wide representationalism, on which both phenomenal properties and the representational properties that they are equivalent to are taken to depend on a subject's environment. | | | Functionalist representationalism might be seen as the result of conjoining the relatively neutral version of representationalism above with functionalism about the phenomenal/nonphenomenal distinction. | | | The natural strategy is then to exploit narrow representational properties in developing a narrow representationalism. |
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http://consc.net/papers/representation.html
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| | Diana Mertz Hsieh: Representationalism and Perceptual Error |
| | Like Descartes, Locke also endorses a version of causal representationalism, for external objects are conceived of as having the capacity to cause the ideas in the mind of which we are aware. | | | Berkeley's criticism of representationalism is clearly much more idealist than that of Leibnitz; in fact, Berkeley is, in many ways, the paradigm case of the idealist. | | | But as later philosophers such as Berkeley will object, there is no justification for positing this causal relationship between external objects and ideas (or even for positing any external objects at all), since we cannot possibly step out of our sense modalities in order to verify or falsify this claim. |
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http://www.dianahsieh.com/undergrad/rape.html
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| | Representational Theories of Consciousness |
| | Representationalism itself is a claim only about qualia in our sense, while transparency is about features of experience more generally. | | | To find an inversion counterexample to the representational theory of qualia, the objector would have to posit qualia inverted with respect to all representational contents, or, in the case of "mixed" or "quasi-" representationalism, qualia inverted with respect to all representational contents and all the relevant functional etc. properties. | | | Even if transparency fails and there are introspectible nonrepresentational features of experiences, those features may not be qualia. |
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http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-representational
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| | The Role of 'Disturbance' for the Origin of Representational Intentionality and for the Announcement of World: Two ... |
| | Representationalism is the assumption that it is possible, at least in principle, to elicit knowledge from an expert in the form of explicit rules and to transfer and implement this knowledge on a computer. | | | Critics of the AI approach very often emphasize that AI technology is based on several assumptions which give a distorted picture how human knowledge really works. | | | In the field of expert systems above all I want to mention three of them here: representationalism, atomism of meaning and computationalism. |
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http://www.pantaneto.co.uk/issue7/leidlmair.htm
(2486 words)
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| | [No title] |
| | Representationalism's distinctive epistemological thesis is that knowledge or justified belief about external objects is indirectly arrived at. | | | Older versions of representationalism cannot make a claim of neutrality, for at a minimum they are committed to the existence of sense data, which are posited as a new ontological category. | | | And since dualism has been the historically dominant philosophical position on the mind/body relation, it should not be surprising that epistemological representationalism has also been dominant. |
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http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/essays/text/stephenhicks/diss/hicksdiss3.html
(9642 words)
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| | [No title] |
| | Thus, insofar as the ambiguity between weak and strong transparency makes the transparency thesis appear more widely shared than it is, the representationalists’ appeal to transparency may appear to have more force than it does. | | | Thus, although weak transparency does not preclude that the properties of which we have introspective awareness are representational properties in some sense, it does preclude that they are representational properties in the sense intended by the representationalists. Representationalism thus requires that that the transparency thesis be understood as strong rather than weak. | | | As I will suggest, there is reason to believe that experience is not transparent in the way that representationalism requires. |
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http://phil-rlst.academic.claremontmckenna.edu/akind/Transparency.doc
(5953 words)
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| | Fibreculture Journal Issue 3 |
| | The problem in representationalism is that everything that is is an object for a subject. | | | The subject of representationalism therefore comes to appear as naturally given, just as, in this view, technology is also a given. | | | This has involved a consideration of the way our relationships to information have changed in the digital, networked era — that our idea of information has changed and that it has become an event, a ‘contradictory and heterogeneous process’ (Derrida, 2002: 6). |
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http://journal.fibreculture.org/issue3/issue3_roe.html
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| | CHAPTER 1 |
| | The first is that ‘representationalism’ is a label which has been attached to a number of positions which would seem to fall into the camp opposite that of the position I consider to be representationalism, such as the sensa realist views of Jackson (1977) and Locke (1700). | | | Since my primary goal is simply to argue for representationalism about experiential content, and Block’s attack on transparency would seem to only be an argument for a particular kind of representationalism, I want to be careful about taking myself too far afield in commenting on his position. | | | In this chapter, my primary goal will be to evaluate the general debate between representationalism and sensa realism. |
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http://www.mindstuff.net/Dissertation/WTWdissertchap1.html
(8717 words)
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| | Body |
| | For instance, although we know the range of electromagnetic waves that the human eye is capable of perceiving, and we know the range of decibels that the human ear is capable of hearing, we do not know with any comparable degree of accuracy the range of representations the human mind is capable of representing. | | | Therefore, the only immediate and direct measurement device that we have to indicate the degree of our representational "acuity" is representationalism itself. | | | But, here, then, is the rub: the complexity and variety of representational skills is made possible by the isolation of representational skills from direct interaction with the natural-historical environment -- leading to greater species adaptability. |
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http://www.loyno.edu/~dmyers/play&evolution.htm
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| | Spiritual Representationalism |
| | Spiritual Representationalism creates the bridge between that which is not-human and the human understanding of the three-dimensional universe. | | | Thus, the ideas, concepts, intuitive senses, and understandings are transformed into information that can be perceived by the five physical senses. | | | Therefore, the first step in the process of creating a work of art in the school of Spiritual Representationalism is that the artist must to some degree focus his consciousness on dimensions beyond the normal 3-D physical reality and receive information, insight, and new concepts from these other dimensions. |
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http://www.thomasalord.com/spiritualrepresentationalism.htm
(481 words)
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| | Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind - phenomenological critique of representationalism |
| | For it would seem that the closely related capacities of pattern recognition and perceptual discrimination, both of which figure prominently in G-Intentionality, far from involving "direct responses [of the agent's body] to familiar perceptual gestalts," rely instead on a high degree of abstraction. | | | Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind - phenomenological critique of representationalism | | | Thanks to our sponsors: Logo design by logobee |
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http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/phenomcritique.html
(1232 words)
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| | [No title] |
| | e x t e r n a l i s t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l i s m . S h o e m a k e r s v i e w a l l o w s n a r r o w p r o p e r t i e s , b u t w i t h c o s t s r e a t t r i b u t i o n o f c o l o r s b y e x p e r i e n c e s . ¡\ z Z Z k Z c Z z k c ªH ” f ó B 2 ¨) Fregean (Intensional) Representationalism ª6 ¨ Fregean (intensional) representationalism: the relevant representational contents are intensional (Fregean) contents In the domain of senses/modes of presentation rather than extension. | | | e x t e r n a l i s t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l i s m . S h o e m a k e r s v i e w a l l o w s n a r r o w p r o p e r t i e s , b u t w i t h c o s t s r e a t t r i b u t i o n o f c o l o r s b y e x p e r i e n c e s . ¡\ z Z Z k Z c Z z k c ªH ” f ó B 2 ¨) Fregean (Intensional) Representationalism ª6 ¨U Fregean (intensional) representationalism: the relevant representational contents are intensional (Fregean) contents In the domain of senses/modes of presentation rather than extension. |
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http://consc.net/papers/neh1.ppt
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| | Experience (and Mental Representation) Outside the Brain |
| | However, current versions of representationalism remain unsatisfactory in that they fail to provide a convincing solution to the "hard problem." (Tye, in fact, holds that the "hard problem" is a pseudo-problem, and thus needs no solution, but his arguments on this point are unconvincing.) | | | It seems possible (even probable) for all brain processes to occur "in the dark". | | | I argue that this failure of current versions of representationalism arises from the assumption that mental representations, and in particular those representations that are conscious experiences, are token identical with brain states. |
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http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/nthomas/outbrain.htm
(434 words)
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| | Philosophical Theories of Consciousness |
| | The first premise is the thesis of transparency, the second one is intended as a conceptual truth (about what we mean by “phenomenal”). | | | Another version of the argument from transparency, one which Tye employs, centers on the idea that rejecting representationalism in the face of transparency would require one to commit to an “error theory.” | | | But it has been somewhat neglected in analytic philosophy of mind. |
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http://www.ephilosopher.com/kriegel/index.php?Papers/Philosophical+Theories+of+Consciousness
(6430 words)
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| | Inverted Qualia |
| | This scenario is therefore the converse of typical inverted spectrum scenarios: instead of keeping the environment fixed and varying the internal constitution of the subject, Inverted Earth varies the environment and (due to the inverting lenses) keeps the subject's internal constitution fixed. | | | And this, of course, is essentially the “secondary quality” account of color that many find in Locke. | | | Because the two experiences have different qualia, any version of representationalism implies that, if this scenario is possible, the two experiences differ in representational content. |
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http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qualia-inverted
(14840 words)
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| | fragments of consciousness: Representationalism showdown |
| | However, phenomenal properties as a type may include properties that are not representational and which occur in other contexts than human cognition. | | | 1) Extensional representationalism - As a matter of extensional fact, all the phenomenal properties in the human mind are representational. | | | If so, the state does not causally covary with P under optimal conditions, so it does not represent P, so it need not have the same phenomenal character as Maxwell's experience. |
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http://fragments.consc.net/djc/2005/09/representationa.html
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| | Epistemological Problems of Perception |
| | The upshot of our discussion so far is that phenomenalism appears entirely untenable, and that at least a better defense than many have supposed possible can be offered for representationalism. | | | There are at least two questions about it that need to be considered. | | | For anyone who has struggled with the idea of sense-data (or the adverbial alternative) and with the difficulties and complexities of representationalism and phenomenalism, the apparent simplicity of direct realism, the way in which it seems to make extremely difficult or even intractable problems simply vanish, may be difficult to resist. |
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http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/stanford/entries/perception-episprob
(6946 words)
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| | DISCOURSE AND SOCIETY |
| | My contention is that representationalism is a bad metaphor: It is bad for professional understanding and bad for human survival. | | | A stronger version insists on direct access to reality whereas a weaker does not. | | | From the last point, it may be noted that there are stronger and weaker versions of representationalism (see Grace 1987 for the consequences of this). |
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http://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Lounge/8112/class4/dis-soc.htm
(2036 words)
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| | Clarence Irving Lewis [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy] |
| | The assumption that there is, is the product of Cartesian representationalism, the 'copy theory' of thought, in which knowledge of an object is taken to be qualitative coincidence between the idea in the mind and the external real object. | | | There is no contradiction between the relativity of knowledge to the knowing mind and the independence of its object. | | | For Lewis knowledge does not copy anything but concerns the relation between this experience and other possible experiences of which this experience is a sign. |
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http://www.iep.utm.edu/l/lewisci.htm
(8415 words)
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| | Books: Consciousness, Color, and Content |
| | The best strategy for dealing with the explanatory gap, he claims, is to consider it a kind of cognitive illusion. | | | Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: New Problems for Representationalism? | | | This book is, in part, devoted to a further development of that theory along with replies to common objections. |
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http://cognet.mit.edu/library/books/view?isbn=0262201291
(262 words)
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| | Qualia |
| | Cases of the third sort, depending upon how they are elucidated further, can pose a challenge to either strong or weaker versions of representationalism. | | | Shoemaker, S. 1998 "Two Cheers for Representationalism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. | | | Counter-examples are also sometimes given in which supposedly experience of one sort or another is present but in which there is no state with representational content. |
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http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/stanford/entries/qualia
(8015 words)
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| | Piet Smit |
| | In order to see how all this theorizing can be worthwhile I propose at the end ways to experimentally investigate the internal representational architecture of the cognitive system by means of dynamicist tools. | | | However, if we analyse the model by Edelman we can see why there is room for a representationalism which is on the one hand essentially dynamic and on the other hand able to account for the internal interactions which cognitive science holds as fundamental for cognition. | | | It is by means of this dynamic representationalism by which we can, in fact, reconcile behaviorism with cognitive science. |
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http://www.nici.ru.nl/~haselag/eec/pietscrip.html
(396 words)
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| | JAC 14 |
| | If ideas are simply “out there,” and language serves only to transfer these already-in-place concepts, the value of studying language, practicing writing, and engaging in classroom discussions about meaning is dubious since these activities deal only with the packaging of concepts, not with concepts themselves. | | | Speech-act theory provides a useful way to approach representationalism and its variants —any theory that regards language as a collection of words that name independently existing concepts. | | | This position is grounded in representationalism to the extent that it assumes an inordinate cleavage between word and concept. |
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http://jac.gsu.edu/jac/14.2/ReaderResponse/3.htm
(1786 words)
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| | The Ism Book: R |
| | The idea that we can and do possess reliable knowledge, both perceptual and conceptual, about reality is known as epistemological realism (obviously a kind of optimism about the possibility of knowledge). | | | Representationalism (Idea in epistemology, Principle and Tradition in aesthetics) — In epistemology, representationalism is the view that the only things we can know are our representations of the world (e.g., ideas, perceptions, beliefs, etc.), not the world itself. | | | In the psychology and philosophy of perception, realism comes in two flavors: direct and indirect (direct realism being the truly realistic position — namely that we perceive the actually existing physical world — whereas indirect realism is often a form of representationalism). |
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http://www.saint-andre.com/ismbook/R.html
(1051 words)
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| | [No title] |
| | Representationalism, as the thesis that all phenomena are appearances, is thus refuted: "If one defines `phenomenon' with the aid of a conception of `appearance' which is still unclear, then everything is stood on its head" (p.53). | | | This should not be surprising, since both Hobbes's and Derrida's analyses imply forms of anti-realism that miss the third way between realism and idealism which phenomenology opens. | | | The very character of the referring signifier, or the structure of representation in general, betrays its essentially derivative status as dependent on phenomenal meaningfulness: as Heidegger declares, "appearing is possible only by reason of a showing-itself" that does not itself merely `appear' (p.53). |
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http://www.fordham.edu/philosophy/davenport/texts/tranphen.htm
(8855 words)
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| | Review of Michael Tye's: Consciousness, Color and Content. |
| | Chapter 4, is still concerned with rebutting various objections that have been or might be made to representationalism, mostly to do with various optical effects, afterimages, illusions and the like. | | | Representationalism may be set to trigger a substantial research program in quality-objectivist metaphysics. | | | (some new, and some previously published) elaborate and amend aspects of the theory of the earlier book, and defend it from various objections that have been or might be made, either to representationalism or to reductive theories of consciousness in general. |
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http://www.calstatela.edu/faculty/nthomas/tyeccc.htm
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| | COLOR EXPERIENCE – LECTURE ONE |
| | This is a view compatible with standard representationalism; while the two perceivers standardly get phenomenally different perceptions from the same objects, this difference in phenomenal character goes with a difference in representational content; that is why one of them must be misperceiving. | | | This is presented as a version of standard representationalism that denies the possibility of spectrum inversion. | | | And that possibility is incompatible with standard representationalism. |
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http://humanities.ucsc.edu/NEH/shoemaker1.htm
(9174 words)
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| | CFP: Representation in Mind |
| | Recently this representationalism has been questioned: dynamical systems theorists suggest that representations are largely unnecessary for cognitive science and the fundamental issues of representational architecture and content remain the subject of heated debate. | | | Cognitive Science was founded on the premise that the processing of internally represented information is critical to understanding and explaining the mind. | | | The aim of this conference is to explore and promote fresh approaches to the question of representationalism. |
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http://www.cryonet.org/cgi-bin/dsp.cgi?msg=11789
(218 words)
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| | INTRODUCTION |
| | Chapter 2 is an examination of the two most prominent versions of conceptual representationalism, cognitivism and doxasticism. | | | The position I take, nonconceptual representationalism, has it that a subject S can have a perceptual experience with the representational content R without possessing any of the concepts that we, as theorists, would use in stating the correctness conditions for that content. | | | I argue that representationalism succeeds in explaining important phenomena, such as the transparency of experience and the role of perceptual experience within the larger network of intentional mental states, which sensa realism cannot accommodate. |
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http://www.mindstuff.net/Dissertation/WTWdissertintro.html
(1011 words)
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| | Concepts, Beings and Things in Contemporary Philosophy and Thomas Aquinas - Questia Online Library |
| | Moreover because words signify concepts without mediation, and mediately signify res extra animam, it is by knowing the concepts as primary objects of knowledge, holding them before the mind's conscious attention, that the language user knows what extra-mental objects are talked about. | | | I will confine myself to the first presuppositions of the picture described above, the presupposition that takes the concept to be a third thing, a mental object or thing "in the mind" in some fashion. | | | This application of the picture of mental representationalism to St. Thomas's analysis puts us in a position to ask whether his appropriation of Aristotle is subject to Putnam's criticism--does it cut at the joints of St. Thomas's appropriation of Aristotle. |
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http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5001890980
(512 words)
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| | representationalism -- Britannica Concise Encyclopedia - The online encyclopedia you can trust! |
| | Theory of knowledge based on the assertion that the mind perceives only mental representations of material objects outside the mind, not the objects themselves. | | | The doctrine, still current in certain philosophical circles, has roots in Cartesianism, the empiricism of John Locke and David Hume, and the idealism of Immanuel Kant. | | | representationalism -- Britannica Concise Encyclopedia - The online encyclopedia you can trust! |
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http://www.britannica.com/ebc/article?eu=402052&query=cartesianism&ct=
(355 words)
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| | APA Comments |
| | Finally, as we could see, the theory of formal unity guarantees an essential connection between the species and the ultimate objects of our simple cognitive acts. | | | Indeed, the label of "representationalism", without a proper understanding of the distinction between immediate and ultimate objects, and without considering whether they are essentially or merely accidentally connected, does not carry any serious theoretical significance. | | | Second, it is not clear at all that even if direct realism could not be established in any way on the basis of the theory of formal unity, it would be impossible to establish on this basis some form of representationalism which could still be effective against skepticism. |
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http://www.fordham.edu/gsas/phil/klima/APA.htm
(1678 words)
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| | Coreference and Representationalism (ResearchIndex) |
| | Abstract: The compositional interpretation of structures in discourse has raised the question whether some level of representation is indispensable in the analysis of the semantics of natural language. | | | In this paper we formulate and motivate three notions of representationalism (a strong, a medium or midweak, and a weak one) and discuss to what extent existing formal semantic frameworks qualify as (strongly, midweakly or weakly) representational. | | | @misc{ dekker-coreference, author = "Paul Dekker", title = "Coreference and Representationalism", url = "citeseer.ist.psu.edu/dekker99coreference.html" } |
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http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/4908.html
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| | Huw Price |
| | We do not and cannot perceive physical objects directly. | | | These contradictions turn on the problem of representationalism, under which term this paper was listed fourth. | | | What Huw claims to prove is that the only way to save naturalism from its own internal contradictions is to turn it into a language game, a la Wittgenstein. |
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http://mywebpages.comcast.net/dantsmith/nexu12.htm
(623 words)
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| | sandbothe.net: Pragmatic Media Philosophy and the Internet |
| | If one makes the pragmatic turn linked with anti-representationalism, then the representationalist distinction between cognition as realistic 'discovery' of reality and knowledge as constructivist 'making' of reality becomes irrelevant. | | | In Rorty's usage the distinction between realistic copy theories and anti-realistic construction theories of cognition does not serve as a synonym for the opposition of representationalism and anti-representationalism, but as an internal difference whose differentiational work is performed within the realm of representationalist positions. | | | On the opposition of representationalism and anti-representationalism see Richard Rorty, "Introduction: Antirepresentationalism, Ethnocentrism, and Liberalism", in: Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, Philosophical Papers, vol. |
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http://www.sandbothe.net/246.html
(7179 words)
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| | Representationalism |
| | Representationalism is also known (in psychology) as Indirect Perception, and (in philosophy) as Indirect Realism, or Epistemological Dualism. | | | Steven Lehar is an independent researcher at the Schepens Eye Research Institute. | | | Representationalism validates a phenomenological approach to studying perception, i.e. |
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http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/Representationalism.html
(1295 words)
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| | Representation, Reduction, etc. |
| | Intentionalism is the weakest form of naturalism with respect to the mind. | | | But as it is mostly the case, philosophical systems not only bear the possibilities and hints of their overcomings, they "bear" also their "overcomers" with the result that philosophical systems which are left behind, leave their traces, their "genetic codes" in the "overcomer" philosophies. | | | Representationalism had been the leading epistemic theory at least since Descartes. |
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http://mywebpages.comcast.net/dantsmith/nexu18.htm
(3806 words)
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| | wip_abstracts |
| | Representationalism uses transparency to defend the claim that the phenomenal character of experience supervenes on its representational content. | | | In this paper I argue that there is more to experience than just representation, and that representationalism displays an unjustified optimism in intentionality, which promises more than it can deliver. |
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http://www.ceu.hu/phil/wip_abstracts.html
(96 words)
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| | Direct realism - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia |
| | Reid argued strenuously against the notion that ideas, or sense-data, are the immediate objects of perception at all -- he rejected representationalism. | | | In contrast, indirect realism and representationalism claim that we are directly aware only of internal representations of the external world. | | | But skepticism and phenomenalism are both absurd; there surely is an external world, and we surely do have knowledge of it. |
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http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_realism
(1337 words)
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| | Brad Thompson's Homepage |
| | Representationalism is sometimes advertised as providing a novel response to the argument from hallucination, one that accepts the presence of a "common factor" between veridical and hallucinatory experience without positing sensory intermediaries between the mind and the world. | | | But vehicle-based representationalism lacks many of the virtues that are frequently advertised for representationalism more generally, and fails to avoid a kind of indirect realism. | | | I argue that ways of appearing are modes of presentations of external properties and objects, and present a detailed theory about the nature of the modes of presentation involved in color experience. |
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http://faculty.smu.edu/bthompso/papers.html
(933 words)
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| | 20th WCP: Representationalism and Antirepresentationalism - Kant, Davidson and Rorty |
| | As it is possible to find nonrepresentationalist "traces" in Kantian epistemology, it is also possible to find quasi transcendentalist elements by Rorty. | | | In this paper I pose the question, whether Rorty is thorougly succesful in his abandomnent. | | | Both, substantialist and antisubstantialist thinking are for Kant hypostasis of the structures of thinking and as such, with Rorty's vocabulary, "representationalisms". |
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http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/TKno/TKnoBoro.htm
(6490 words)
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| | Encyclopedia4U - Critical realism - Encyclopedia Article |
| | By its talk of sense-data and representation, this theory depends on or presupposes the truth of representationalism. | | | If critical realism is correct, then representationalism would have to be a correct theory of perception. |
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http://www.encyclopedia4u.com/c/critical-realism.html
(202 words)
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| | The New Representationalism |
| | In many ways the new representationalism can be seen as a reaction to the dead-ends of that strategy. | | | To extend paint to its full range of possibilities, to create a fleshed-out illusion of things in the round and thus to tell a story: these are deep primal urges that have been altered but not cheated by the photograph. | | | Yet their paintings reflect two successive developments in the art world that have profoundly changed what it means to paint representationally today, namely, Pop art (and its cousins Minimalism and Conceptualism) and the work that came to be known as Picture Theory, appropriation-based art of the 1980's. |
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http://www.inch.com/~adhocism/CAT.html
(2770 words)
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| | representation |
| | So, like the other versions of representationalism, Neo-Representationalism appears to be too exclusive, and thus not a satisfactory definition of art. | | | The claim of Representationalism is that a necessary property of artworks is that they represent in just this way. | | | In order for this argument to be convincing, however, we would need to be convinced that it does provide the best explanation of readymades (i.e. |
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http://aesthetics.moonfruit.com/representation
(852 words)
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| | representationalism - OneLook Dictionary Search |
| | Representationalism : The Ism Book A Field Guide to the Nomenclature of Philosophy [home, info] | | | representationalism : FOLDOP - Free On Line Dictionary Of Philosophy [home, info] | | | Tip: Click on the first link on a line below to go directly to a page where "representationalism" is defined. |
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http://onelook.com/cgi-bin/cgiwrap/bware/dofind.cgi?word=representationalism
(137 words)
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